Data security for digital data storage

ABSTRACT

A computing system includes data encryption in the data path between a data source and data storage devices. The data storage devices may be local or they may be network resident. The data encryption may utilize a key which is derived at least in part from an identification code stored in a non-volatile memory. The key may also be derived at least in part from user input to the computer. In a LAN embodiment, public encryption keys may be automatically transferred to a network server for file encryption prior to file transfer to a client system.

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.11/521,163, filed Sep. 14, 2006; which is a divisional of U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 09/818,699, filed Mar. 27, 2001, now U.S. Pat. No.7,526,795, the entireties of which are hereby incorporated herein byreference.

BACKGROUND

1. Field

The invention relates to methods and apparatus for providing securityfor digital data stored on personal computers and network servers ondata storage media such as magnetic and optical disks and tapes.

2. Description of the Related Art

Over the past several years, personal computing systems have become morepowerful, smaller, and less expensive. As this has occurred, more andmore computing applications are performed on personal computerplatforms. Local and wide area networks of personal computers are nowoften used in corporate and business applications instead of the largemainframes used for the same applications in the past. A further resultof the increases in performance and decreases in price of personalcomputers is a dramatic increase in personal computer use for householdfinancial and other sensitive and preferably confidential information.

The use of personal computers in these applications raises data securityand privacy issues, which have thus far been insufficiently resolved.Laptop and other personal computers, as well as the removable datastorage media used in them are transported, mislaid, lost, and sometimesstolen. Consequently, security and privacy issues which were not presentwhen computers and their data storage media were generally fixed havenow become prominent. Administrators of computer resources in thebusiness environment must remain aware of the location of portablecomputing devices as well as the nature of the programs and data storedon them. For home users, concerns arise if credit card, social security,or bank account numbers are present on fixed or removable media whichmay be lost or stolen. In the network environment, sensitive orconfidential data may be stored on resources available to several users.

To resolve a few of these concerns, some programs allow the user topassword protect documents or files, thereby preventing access to thedata in the file unless the password is known. This provides limitedsecurity, however, since these schemes are easy to defeat with widelyavailable password extraction programs. Furthermore, although the act ofopening the file may be restricted in the relevant application program,the data itself resides on the media in raw form, and may still beextracted by a trained computer user.

Systems have also been proposed which perform encryption on data andapplication programs stored on tape and disk. These systems provideimproved security over the password protection described above. As oneexample, a system disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 5,325,430 to Smyth et al.(incorporated herein by reference in its entirety) includes a securitymodule attached to a personal computer which performs data andapplication program encryption. The security module communicates with aremovable smart card assigned to a given user which contains encryptionkeys used by the security module. Although the security provided by thissystem is adequate for many applications, the circuitry used toimplement the system is complex, and administration of the system forproducing and assigning keys and smart cards is time consuming andexpensive.

Another system for encrypting files is disclosed in U.S. Pat. No.5,235,641 to Nozawa et al., the disclosure of which is also incorporatedherein by reference in its entirety. In this system, data stored to amagnetic tape is encrypted by a cryptographic adapter which is locatedin the data path between a host processor and a tape drive. In thissystem, the host processor generates cryptographic keys which are storedon the tape itself. This requires additional logic to encrypt the keysas well as the data, and consequently, this system requires relativelycomplex circuitry, and leaves the key potentially recoverable from thetape itself if the key encryption scheme is broken.

Thus, existing encryption systems for personal and portable computershave serious drawbacks, and have not been widely implemented. Inparticular, a system which is useful for both an individual personalcomputer user and users connected through a computer network has notbeen heretofore provided. Such a system should provide data securitywith flexibility and without expensive administration or implementation.

SUMMARY

In one embodiment, the invention comprises a method of transferringfiles over a computer network comprising storing a public encryption keyand a private encryption key in a client computer system, sending arequest for a data file from the client to a network server, and inresponse to the request, encrypting the data file with the publicencryption key in the server automatically and without userintervention. The encrypted data file is then sent to the clientcomputer system.

The network server may automatically retrieve the public encryption keyfrom the client computer system, and may also check a file attribute todetermine that the file is to be encrypted with the public encryptionkey.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a data storage system incorporating anembodiment of the invention.

FIG. 2 is a flow chart illustrating acts performed during key generationin an embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating an encrypting data path passingfrom a host processor to data storage devices, in accordance with oneembodiment of the invention.

FIG. 4 is a flow chart illustrating acts performed during key generationin another embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 5 is a flow chart of a process of encrypted file transfer in anetwork environment in accordance with one embodiment of the invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

Embodiments of the invention will now be described with reference to theaccompanying Figures, wherein like numerals refer to like elementsthroughout. The terminology used in the description presented herein isnot intended to be interpreted in any limited or restrictive manner,simply because it is being utilized in conjunction with a detaileddescription of certain specific embodiments of the invention.Furthermore, embodiments of the invention may include several novelfeatures, no single one of which is solely responsible for its desirableattributes or which is essential to practicing the invention hereindescribed.

Referring now to FIG. 1, a data storage system is illustrated whichincorporates aspects of the invention. The system includesencryption/decryption logic 10 that is connected to receive digital datafrom a data bus 12. The encryption/decryption logic 10 is configured toforward data received from the data bus 12 to data storage devices 14 inan encrypted form. The data or information transferred between the databus 12 and the data storage devices may comprise application programsthemselves, data used by application programs, or any other informationthat the host computing system stores to the data storage devices 14 ofthe system. As will be further explained below with reference to FIGS. 2and 3, the encryption/decryption logic may in some embodiments beconfigurable to perform the encryption and decryption on a selectablesubset of the data storage devices if desired by a user of the system.

The algorithm used to perform the encryption may comprise any knownencryption algorithm, and many different alternatives will be well knownto those of skill in the art. In many applications, the encryption anddecryption process will be defined in part by a key 16 which is utilizedby the encryption/decryption logic 10 to perform the data manipulationwhich results in data encryption and decryption. In some systems, thesame key is used for both the encryption and decryption processes, butin others, the key 16 may comprise a pair of keys, wherein one is usedfor encryption, and the other for decryption. Public key cryptographicsystems, where an encryption key is publicly available and a decryptionkey is maintained secret by a user, is one example of such a system.Given the variety of encryption and decryption schemes which have beenand are currently being developed, the use of the word “key” is intendedto encompass any piece of information, data, parameter, definition,configuration of logic circuitry, or other entity or circuit arrangementwhich serves at least in part to configure the encryption/decryptionlogic, or to otherwise in any way partly or wholly define the dataencryption process which is performed by the encryption/decryption logic10.

Also provided in the system of FIG. 1 is a non-volatile memory location18. As is well known in the art, a non-volatile memory has the propertythat the data or information stored in it remains when the host systemis powered down. Non-volatile memory may comprise battery backed up RAM,EPROM, EEPROM, or ROM memory circuitry, for example. In the applicationof FIG. 1, this memory location 18 may advantageously store anidentification code. The stored identification code may be used toderive, at least in part, the key 16 which is used in the encryptionprocess. This derivation may involve simply making the key theidentification code itself, or may alternatively involve a logical ormathematical manipulation or transformation of the identification codeto produce the key. In some embodiments, as will be further explainedbelow, the key 16 may be derived in part from the identification codestored in the non-volatile memory and in part from a password or otherpiece of information entered by a user of the computing system.

The system of FIG. 1 includes many advantages over prior art dataencryption schemes and is especially applicable to individual personalcomputer and laptop computer users. In some embodiments, the circuitryof FIG. 1 may be incorporated into, for example, a laptop computer whichis sold to an individual for household and/or business use. In most ofthese situations, the purchased computer will not be a member of a groupof computers which is controlled or overseen by a system administratorthat will create and assign encryption keys, smart cards, etc. Rather,the laptop will be simply used as is, for both personal and business useby a user who is generally unfamiliar with data security techniques orprocedures.

in these embodiments, the identification code may comprise a multi-bitdata word which is associated with the individual laptop being used.When stored in a non-erasable memory element such as ROM or EPROM, theidentification code may be substantially permanently associated with theindividual laptop being used. It will be appreciated that data securityin these environments is enhanced if different laptops do not typicallyshare a common identification code. When this is true, the key 16derived from the identification code will be different in differentlaptops produced by the laptop manufacturer. It will therefore also beappreciated that the data stored on the data storage devices 14 will beencrypted differently by different laptops. Thus, a removable media suchas a floppy disk, tape, or writeable CD will not be useable on anycomputer except the one that originally stored the data. Thus, a levelof security is provided for removable media which may be lost, mislaid,or stolen.

It will also be appreciated that this level of security is providedwithout any intervention by the user or a system administrator. Keygeneration and data encryption is automatic and transparent. Inaddition, this data security scheme is easily implemented in the largescale production of laptops and other personal computers. Machinespecific data encryption may be provided with the simple provision ofnon-volatile storage of information which defines the data encryptionprocess performed. This information may advantageously be substantiallyuniquely associated with the host computing logic or host computer. Thismay be ensured by using some form of sequential numbering scheme for theidentification code, or alternatively a random or pseudo-randomnumbering scheme with a low probability of producing two identicalidentification codes for different laptops. However, it may be notedthat it is not necessary to absolutely guarantee that each laptop have auniquely defined encryption process. The desirable feature is that therebe a relatively low probability that lost or stolen media will bereadable in some other laptop or personal computer available to someonewho has found or has stolen the media elements. Therefore, duplicateidentification codes and keys defining identical encryption processesmay be provided within a given set of computers while still maintaininga useful level of security. Thus, the association between identificationcodes and their respective host computers need only be substantiallyunique such that a reasonable level of security is created.

FIG. 2 illustrates a method of key generation and data encryptionaccording to one embodiment of the invention. It will be appreciatedthat the method shown in FIG. 2 may, in one embodiment, be implementedon hardware illustrated in FIG. 1.

The method begins at a start state 22, and moves from there to step 24,where an identification code is retrieved. The identification code maybe stored in a non-volatile memory, and may in addition be substantiallyuniquely associated with specific host computer hardware.

The system then moves to decision state 26, where it is decided whetheror not some user input should be utilized in the process of encryptionkey generation. If not, the method moves directly to step 28, where anencryption key is generated using the identification code retrieved atstep 24. If user input is to be used in key generation, the method movesfrom step 26 to step 30, where the user input is accepted by the system.The user input may, for example, comprise an alphanumeric code which istyped into the computer keyboard by the user in response to a systemprompt. Following this, the method moves to step 28, where the key isgenerated using both the identification code and the user input. Theuser input from step 30 may be an alphanumeric sequence which isconverted to a multi-bit word (for example, to ASCII code). This wordmay be combined with the identification code in many ways, includingconcatenation as one simple example, or other more complicated logicalor mathematical manipulations may be used.

Following key generation at step 28, the key is used to encrypt anddecrypt data that is stored to and retrieved from a data storage deviceat step 32. In the personal computer or laptop computer context, theseries of steps leading to and including key generation may be performedduring the boot operation prior to any accesses to encrypted datastorage devices. In these embodiments, all data, programs, etc. storedon the data storage devices are encrypted with the same key, a key whichmay require some user input to generate as described above. The computermay be either factory configured or user configured to require or notrequire user input for key generation.

The addition of user input to key generation provides an enhancement todata security beyond that provided when only the identification code isused to derive an encryption key. This is because if the entire computeris lost or stolen, when the computer is turned on only the computerowner will know what code or password to input in order to generate theproper key at step 28 of FIG. 2. Thus, access to encrypted programs anddata is effectively prevented even with the original computer the handsof an unauthorized user.

An embodiment of the invention is also illustrated in FIG. 3 which maybe used to implement the process described above with reference to FIG.2. In this Figure, a computer system is shown having a host processor36, which may, for example, comprise a member of the Pentium family ofprocessors such as the Pentium, Pentium Pro, or Pentium II. Althoughindustry standard PC architecture is used as an illustrative example inthis Figure, it will be appreciated that many computer designs may beimplemented using the principles illustrated herein. Also provided aspart of the computer system of FIG. 3 are a plurality of data storagedevices, including hard disk drives 38, 40, a floppy disk drive 42 and aCD drive 45, which may be of a writeable type. The computer system mayalso be coupled to a network server 47, and form a client node of alocal or wide area network. In many typical embodiments, the computersystem comprises a laptop or other form of personal computer.

The processor 36 interfaces with a host bus 44 which also interfaceswith a bridge circuit 46. The bridge circuit 46 routes data from thehost bus 44 to a PCI bus 48. The PCI bus 48 provides a data source to alogic circuit 50 which is provided in the data path between the PCI bus48 and an IDE bus 52 and floppy drive control bus 54 which interfacedirectly with the respective data storage devices 38, 40, 42, 44, and46. The PCI bus 48 may also receive data from I/O devices 56 via a PCIto ISA bridge circuit 58.

The logic circuit 50 advantageously includes an encryption engine 60which operates to encrypt data routed to one or more of the data storagedevices 38, 40, 42, 46, or the network server 47 and to decrypt datarouted from one or more of these sources when required. The logiccircuit 50 will also generally include input and output bridge circuitry51 to buffer data and convert the data transfer protocol from the PCIformat bus 48 to the busses 52, 54, 55 which interface directly with thedata storage devices 38, 40, 42, 46 and network server 47.

The encryption engine operates under the control of control logic 62.The control logic, in turn, receives information for controlling theencryption engine from three sources. The first is a memory locationwhich stores a hardware identifier 64. As described above, this hardwareidentifier 64 may be substantially uniquely associated with the computerhardware. The memory may comprise a non-volatile writeable or read onlymemory to help ensure essentially permanent storage of the hardwareidentifier 64. As is also described above, the hardware identifier 64stored in the memory may be used by the control logic 62 (oralternatively the processor 36) to at least in part derive a key forencryption and decryption of data to and from the data storage devices38, 40, 42, 46. The control logic may also accept user input asdescribed above to be used as additional information for key derivation.

This generated key may be stored in a key register 66 which also iscoupled to the control logic 62. Prior to data being stored or retrievedfrom the data storage devices 38, 40, 42, 46, the key may be retrievedfrom the key register 66 for use by the encryption engine 60 during theencryption and decryption processes.

A configuration register 70 may also be coupled to the control logic 62.The content of the configuration register 70 may advantageously be userdefined, and may include bits that determine which of the data storagedevices 38, 40, 42, 46 have data encrypted before storage to the media,and which have data decrypted when data is retrieved from the media.This feature provides significant flexibility to the user. A user may,for example, want to encrypt some, but not all, data stored onto afloppy disk with the floppy drive 42. It may also be advantageous tohave at least one hard drive 38 or 40, which contains DOS, Windows (™),Unix (™), or other operating system software, to remain unencrypted.

The configuration register may also contain bits which determine whetheror not user input should be incorporated into the key being used toperform the encryption and decryption. In some embodiments, a differentkey may be stored for different drives. In this case, some of the keysmay be generated with user input, and some without.

One advantageous aspect of the encryption system described herein isthat it may be created with relatively minor modifications to currentlyexisting integrated circuits. PCI to ISA and PCI to IDE bridges are wellknown and understood, and are commercially available from, for example,Intel Corporation. In one embodiment, therefore, an encryption engine,control logic, a key register, and a configuration register may beincorporated into an existing bridge integrated circuit design toproduce a portion of the logic circuit 50. Furthermore, individualEPROM, EEPROM, and ROM memories which include pre-programmedidentification codes are available commercially from DallasSemiconductor of Dallas Texas as part numbers DS2401 and DS2430 forexample. These devices include a unique 48 bit serial number in a ROMstorage location which may be utilized as the memory location whichstores the hardware identifier 64. These memory chips are available witha serial I/O interface for reading the identification code and any otherstored data. In this embodiment, therefore, a bridge integrated circuitwhich includes the encryption logic may interface over a serial bus to aseparate memory integrated circuit which stores the hardware identifier.

FIG. 4 illustrates a method of key generation and verification which maybe implemented with the system illustrated in FIG. 3. In the method ofFIG. 4, the control logic 62 (FIG. 3) may be utilized to perform keygeneration and verification without intervention by the processor 36(FIG. 3). The method begins at a start state 76. Following this startblock 76, the system retrieves the hardware identifier 64 (FIG. 3) fromthe non-volatile memory location where it is stored. This retrievalprocess may involve the sequential retrieval of a set of data words fromthe memory as illustrated by the loop defined by blocks 78, 80, and 82.Thus, at block 78, the control logic 62 may output an initial address tothe non-volatile memory to retrieve a first data word comprising aportion of the hardware identifier code 64. The address may then beincremented at block 80. If, at decision block 82, it is determined thatthe entire code has not yet been retrieved, the system loops back toblock 78 and outputs the incremented address to the non-volatile memoryto retrieve another segment of the code.

Once the entire code has been retrieved, at block 84 the control logic62 may then generate and verify the key. As mentioned above, the processof key generation may involve merely storing a concatenation of the datawords retrieved at steps 78-82 in the key register 66. This could occurduring the retrieval process, or afterwards. Alternatively, mathematicalor logical manipulations may be performed on the retrieved data wordsprior to their storage into the key register. Key verification may alsobe performed in a number of ways known to those of skill in the art. Forexample, a checksum or CRC field may be provided in the configurationregister 70 or control logic 62. If no user input is utilized in keygeneration, this field may be generated during an initializationsequence performed during the manufacture of either the logic circuit 50or a computer system that the logic circuit 50 is incorporated into. Ifuser input is utilized in key generation, this CRC or checksum field maybe generated during a password initialization routine when the passwordto be utilized in key generation is initially entered by the user.

Following key generation and verification, the system moves to adecision state 86, where the result of the key verification of block 84is checked. If the key is verified as good, the system moves to block88, and the key is used to encrypt and decrypt data during data storageand retrieval operations. There are several reasons why key verificationmight fail. An error in reading the hardware identifier may cause faultykey generation. Tampering with the logic circuit 50 may also result inincorrect key generation. Additionally, key verification may failbecause required operator input to be used in key generation has not yetbeen entered by a user. Thus, a failure of key verification may forceuser input. This is illustrated in FIG. 4 by the fact that if, atdecision state 86, the key has not been verified as good, the systemmoves to a another decision state 90. At decision state 90, the systemdetermines whether or not user input should be accepted and used in thekey generation process. If the system determines that operator inputshould be accepted, the system moves to block 92, where the input isread. The system then loops back to block 84, where the key is generatedusing both the operator input and the retrieved identification code, andis again verified against the stored CRC or checksum field. If theoperator input was the correct password, the key will be verified asgood at the next iteration of decision block 86, and at block 88, thekey will be used to encrypt and decrypt data as described above.

If, however, the operator input was incorrect, the key verificationprocess will fail, and the system will again move to decision state 90,where the system again determines whether or not user input should beaccepted. It will be appreciated that the user may be given two or moreattempts to successfully input the proper password. Thus, the system mayloop back to blocks 92 and 84 a plurality of times, any one of which mayresult in correct password entry and normal data encryption anddecryption at block 88.

After a selected number of iterations of incorrect password entry, thesystem may decide at state 90 to refuse to accept further operator inputfor key generation. In this event, the system moves to block 94 wherethe key error is flagged by the system. System response to the errorflag may vary widely. The system may indicate to the user that thepassword entries are incorrect. The system may even be programmed todestroy the content of encrypted drives in the event the keyverification process fails, or fails for a selected number ofconsecutive verification attempts.

The encryption system described thus provides data security to personaland laptop computer users in a transparent manner without requiring timeconsuming and expensive system administration or complex and expensivehardware. The system is especially adapted to individual users, and thehigh volume production of computers for these users. In addition, thesystem can be advantageously utilized to form an easily administratedsecure computer networking system.

In the network environment, files which are stored to network drivesassociated with a network server (FIG. 3) may be encrypted by the localsystem prior to file transfer in a manner analogous to that set forthabove when storing data files to local data storage devices. In thisway, a given user's personal or confidential data may be protected whenresident on a network accessible storage resource. In the networkembodiment, public key cryptography is advantageously used becausepublic encryption keys can be made available to the network serversand/or clients such that appropriate encryption processes can beperformed transparently and without user intervention by differentelements of the network.

One example of a method of file transfer in a network embodiment of theinvention is illustrated by the flow chart of FIG. 5. It can beappreciated that in a network environment, files may be stored atvarious dispersed locations. If the transparent encryption during saveoperations is employed as described above, different files on the samestorage device may be encrypted with different keys depending on whichclient system performed the save operation. In addition, networkaccessible drives may include unencrypted files as well. Of course, anyof these files may be retrieved by a client and stored on their ownlocal drive.

Referring now to FIG. 5, in one embodiment of the invention, at block100 a request for a file is forward from a client to a network server.At block 102, the network server checks the status of an encryptionattribute associated with the file. This attribute is set or cleareddepending on whether or not the file is already encrypted on the networkserver or is unencrypted. If the file was previously stored by therequesting client, the file may already be encrypted with the client'spublic key. In this case, the attribute would indicate that the file isencrypted, and may in some embodiments additionally indicate the ownerof the public key that it was encrypted with. If at decision state 104it is determined that the attribute indicates the file is alreadyencrypted, then the server sends the file to the client at block 106.Once there, the file is decrypted using the private key stored by therequestor, and is then viewed and/or stored locally.

It is possible that the requested file has been stored on the networkserver encrypted with a different user's public key. If this informationis provided by the file attribute, the system may forward the requestingclient a message indicating this fact. If the file is still sent to therequestor, it will of course be unreadable by them because they will nothave access to the private key of the user that originally encrypted andstored the file.

If alternatively it is determined at decision state 104 that the file isnot encrypted, at block 108 the server retrieves the public key of therequestor. This may be done directly by retrieving the key from thememory location 66 (FIG. 3) where the public and private keys are storedon the requestor's system. It is also possible that the server couldhave a public key table stored locally from which the appropriate publickey is available. Once the requestor's public key is retrieved by theserver, at block 110 it uses the key to encrypt the file, and then sendsthe file to the requesting client where as described above it isdecrypted for viewing and/or local storage. Preferably, all of theattribute checking and key retrieval is performed transparently withoutany user intervention.

The invention thus has advantageous applicability to both stand alonecomputers and network systems. Files are stored either focally or on anetwork securely without effort on the part of the computer user. Inaddition, in the network embodiment, management of the cryptographicsystem and circuitry in each client computer can be controlled by acentral administrator. In this embodiment, the configuration informationstored in the memory 70 (FIG. 3) of each client may be accessible andalterable by a network administrator. Which files are encrypted and whencould be centrally controlled however the administrator desired. Ifdesired, key generation and distribution could also be controlled by theadministrator.

The foregoing description details certain embodiments of the invention.It will be appreciated, however, that no matter how detailed theforegoing appears in text, the invention can be practiced in many ways.As is also stated above, it should be noted that the use of particularterminology when describing certain features or aspects of the inventionshould not be taken to imply that the terminology is being re-definedherein to be restricted to including any specific characteristics of thefeatures or aspects of the invention with which that terminology isassociated. The scope of the invention should therefore be construed inaccordance with the appended claims and any equivalents thereof.

1-18. (canceled)
 19. Apparatus configured to store data, the apparatuscomprising: apparatus configured to receive an encryption key generatedby a first computer, the encryption key uniquely associated at least inpart with a user of the first computer; apparatus configured to obtainencrypted data via the first computer, the encrypted data having beengenerated using the encryption key; apparatus configured to receive afile attribute to be stored, the file attribute in association with theencrypted data denoting the data as encrypted, and further indicating asource of the encryption key; apparatus configured to cause anindication of the source of the encrypted data to be stored; and logicconfigured to: when a request is received from a requestor for theencrypted data, and the requestor is the source of the encrypted data,forward the encrypted data to the requestor; and when a request isreceived from a requestor for non-encrypted data, encrypt thenon-encrypted data with the encryption key associated with the requestorand forward the encrypted data to the requestor.
 20. The apparatus ofclaim 19, wherein the logic is further configured to, when the requestoris not a source of the encrypted data, send the requestor a messageindicating that the encrypted data is not associated with the requestor.21. The apparatus of claim 19, further comprising apparatus configuredto automatically obtain the encryption key from the first computer toencrypt the non-encrypted data.
 22. The apparatus of claim 19, furthercomprising apparatus configured to process a request to retrieve data,wherein the processing comprises checking the file attribute prior toproviding the data back to the first computer.
 23. The apparatus ofclaim 19, further comprising apparatus configured to cheek the fileattribute to determine whether data is in unencrypted form prior toencryption thereof.
 24. The apparatus of claim 19, wherein theencryption key comprises at least one of a private encryption key and apublic encryption key.
 25. The apparatus of claim 24, wherein public keyis obtained by the apparatus from the first computer.
 26. The apparatusof claim 24, wherein the apparatus is configured to store the publicencryption key and the encrypted data.
 27. A computerized storagesystem, comprising: a storage device; a processor in data communicationwith the storage device, the processor configured to execute at leastone computer program comprising a plurality of instructions configuredto, when executed by the processor: receive a user-specific encryptionkey; receive user-specific information enabling an authorized entity toaccess first data based at least in part on an association of theuser-specific information and the first data; encrypt the first dataupon a determination that the first data has not been previouslyencrypted as a first encrypted data, using at least the user-specificencryption key so as to produce the first encrypted data; store thefirst encrypted data and the user-specific information on the storagedevice; receive a request for access to the first encrypted data;determine, based at least in part on the stored user-specificinformation, whether the request is received from the authorized entity;and when it is determined that the request is received from theauthorized entity, provide the requested first encrypted data thereto.28. The computer storage system of claim 27, wherein the plurality ofinstructions are further configured to, when executed: determine that arequesting entity is not to be the authorized entity of the encrypteddata; and cause transmission of a message indicating that the encrypteddata is not associated with the requesting entity.
 29. The computerstorage system of claim 27, wherein the computerized storage system isconfigured to obtain the user-specific encryption key from theauthorized entity to enable said encryption of the non-encrypted data.30. The computer storage system of claim 27, wherein the computerizedstorage system is configured to check the association of theuser-specific information and the first data to at least determine thatthe first data is in unencrypted form prior to encrypting.
 31. Thecomputer storage system of claim 27, wherein the authorized entitycomprises a specific user.
 32. A method of storing data in acomputerized storage system, comprising: generating an encryption keyusing a first computer, the encryption key being uniquely associated atleast in part with a user; encrypting data using the generated key andfirst computer to generate first encrypted data; causing the firstencrypted data to be stored on a computerized storage device, thecomputerized storage device connected via a network to the firstcomputer; and providing an attribute to be stored on the storage device,the attribute in association with the first encrypted data (i)designating the data as encrypted, and (ii) indicating the associationbetween the user and the encryption key; wherein the attribute isconfigured to cause requested data that has not been previouslyencrypted to be encrypted using the encryption key to generate secondencrypted data, the second encrypted data to be provided to a source ofthe request.
 33. The method of claim 32, further comprising decryptingthe first encrypted data by the first computer using at least theencryption key.
 34. The method of claim 32, further comprisingdecrypting at least a portion of the second encrypted data by the firstcomputer using at least the encryption key.
 35. The method of claim 32,wherein the encryption key associated with the user comprises at leastone of a private encryption key and a public encryption key.
 36. Themethod of claim 32, wherein the act of generating the encryption key isbased at least in part on receiving a unique identifier from a storagelocation within the first computer.